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Abstract
We examine the effects of monetary policy on income inequality in Japan
using a novel econometric approach that jointly estimates the Gini coefficient
based on micro-level grouped data of households and the dynamics of macroe-
conomic quantities. Our results indicate different effects on income inequality
for different types of households: A monetary tightening increases inequality
when income data is based on households whose head is employed (workers’
households), while the effect reverses over the medium term when considering
a broader definition of households. Differences in the relative strength of the
transmission channels can account for this finding. Finally we demonstrate that
the proposed joint estimation strategy leads to more informative inference while
results based on the frequently used two-step estimation approach yields incon-
clusive results.
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1 Introduction
While there is a long-standing literature on the nexus between income inequality and
economic growth, income distribution and monetary policy have been traditionally
considered separate issues. The outbreak of the global financial crisis and the sub-
sequent recession led major central banks to loosen their monetary policy stance.
This spiked new interest in the relationship between monetary policy and income in-
equality – also since a lot of these measures comprised asset purchases by the central
bank and it is known that price movements in assets should impact inequality. Hith-
erto, empirical work did not provide clear evidence, also since transmission channels
seem complex and depend on the distribution of financial assets and liabilities in the
population - at best, a modest effect of monetary policy on inequality can be found
in the data (Amaral, 2017). In recent contributions, Coibion et al. (2017) for the
USA, Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) for the UK and Furceri et al. (2017) for
a broader set of countries, a systematic impact of monetary policy on inequality has
been established: If monetary policy is tightened, inequality increases.
One reason why the literature on the monetary policy and inequality nexus is
scarce might be that effects of monetary policy in a macroeconomic context are fre-
quently addressed within a time series framework such as a vector autoregression
(VAR). Income data, however, is often collected in surveys that are available only
over a short time period, or isolated years. For example, the Japanese National Sur-
vey of Family Income and Expenditure offers very detailed information on household
income and expenditures but is carried out every five years only. To circumvent the
paucity of continuous time series on income data, researchers have used grouped data
that are constructed by aggregating individual observations of a variable into groups
and are available over a longer time horizon. Using these data directly, however,
would imply the stark assumption that all households within a group have the same
income (Chotikapanich et al., 2007b). Instead, the underlying distribution has to be
estimated using suitable econometric tools (see, e.g., Chotikapanich et al., 2007a).
In this paper we investigate the effects of monetary policy on income inequality
in Japan. For that purpose, we propose a novel econometric approach that jointly
models the Gini coefficient based on micro-level grouped data of households and the
dynamics of macroeconomic quantities. In that sense we combine the predominant
framework used in monetary economics, VAR models, and the methods used to esti-
mated income distributions. The proposed model is a generalization of the work of
Nishino et al. (2012) to the VAR case and allows for a coherent and joint estimation
of macroeconomic key variables and income inequality. This is a significant improve-
ment over existing approaches that calculate measures of inequality in a first step and
treat them as observed data in the subsequent estimations. As pointed out in Carriero
et al. (2017) this might lead to a severe bias and flawed inference.
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Our main results are as follows. First, we find that the effect of monetary pol-
icy on income inequality depends on the household under consideration. A mone-
tary tightening leads to an increase in income inequality through the job destruction
channel and a loss in external competitiveness considering households whose head
is employed. For a broader measure of income that also covers households that are
unemployed or retired, both channels are not effective. Here the tax inflation channel
leads to a decrease in inequality. We also show that the proposed estimation frame-
work leads to more informative inference compared to the frequently used two-step
estimation approach that treats the measure of inequality and the dynamics of the
macroeconomy separately.
The paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces the model, while
section 3 summarizes the data. Section 4 presents the main findings from the estima-
tion, while section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we describe the econometric approach. First of all, we introduce
the static model to estimate the income distribution from grouped data. Following
Nishino and Kakamu (2011), we assume a log-normal distribution of income which
provides a good fit for Japanese data.1 Let x ∼ LN (µ, σ2), with LN denoting a
lognormal distribution and associated probability density function (PDF) given by
f(x|µ, σ2) = 1
x
√
2piσ2
exp
{
−(lnx− µ)
2
2σ2
}
.
The cumulative density function (CDF) is
F (x) = Φ
(
lnx− µ
σ
)
,
where Φ(·) denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Then, the Gini
coefficient of the lognormal distribution is defined as
G = 2Φ
(
σ√
2
)
− 1,
and we notice that the Gini coefficient is a monotone function of σ.
Assume that the income distribution is x ∼ LN (µ, σ2) with pith quantiles (i =
1, . . . , k), where pi =
ni
n
denote the relative frequencies and 1 ≤ n1 < n2 < . . . < nk ≤
1Alternatively one could estimate a Pareto distribution or more generally a generalized beta distri-
bution, for the latter, however, it is not straightforward to calculate the Gini coefficient; see for example
McDonald and Ransom (2008).
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n, are observed as (x1, x2, . . . , xk) from n observations. In the empirical application,
xk is going to denote the endpoint of each income category (as opposed to the mean
value). Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk)′, then by the asymptotic theorem of the selected order
statistics,
√
n(ln x− µ− σu) ∼ N (0k, σ2W) as n→∞,
where u = (u1, u2, . . . , uk)′, ui = Φ−1(pi), Φ−1(·) is the inverse distribution function,
0k = (0, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
)′ and the ijth element of W is defined as
wij = wji =
pi(1− pj)
φ (Φ−1(pi))φ (Φ−1(pj))
, (i ≤ j),
where φ(·) is the PDF of the standard normal distribution. The proof of these asymp-
totic properties is provided in Nishino and Kakamu (2011) using a static model.
Drawing on these properties Nishino et al. (2012) extended the static model to the
time series framework, modeling the volatility of the distribution as a stochastic pro-
cess. Nishino and Kakamu (2015) show that the income inequality in Japan is indeed
persistent and can be modeled using a stochastic volatility framework.
Let xt = (x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xk,t)′ and yt = (y1,t, y2,t, . . . , ym,t)′ be the income data and
macroeconomic variables of the tth period (t = 1, 2, . . . , T ), respectively. Then, we
propose the following joint model:
ln xt = µt + exp(ht/2)ut + exp(ht/2)t, t ∼ N (0k,W∗t ) , (2.1)
yt = α + Byt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0m,Σ) , (2.2)
where ut = (u1,t, u2,t, . . . , uk,t)′, W∗t = n
−1
t Wt, y1,t = ht, α is an m × 1 vector of
parameters, and B and Σ are m×m matrices of parameters, and we assume y0 = 0m
for simplicity.2 In the empirical section, we use 1 lag.
The likelihood function of this model is written as
L(X|Y,µ,α,B,Σ)
∝
∫
· · ·
∫ T∏
t=1
exp
(
−ht
2
)
exp
(
−v
′
tW
∗−1
t vt
2 exp(ht)
)
|Σ|− 12 exp
(
−e
′
tΣ
−1et
2
)
dh1 . . . dhT ,
(2.3)
2It should be mentioned that this model is a straightforward extension of the simple stochastic
volatility model. In the recent financial time series analysis, the leverage effect, which is a drop in
the return followed by an increase in the volatility, plays an important role. However, in the context
of income data, stylized facts do not report such a leverage effect. Thus, we assume independence
between the variance and the distribution over time.
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where X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xT ), µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µT )′, vt = ln xt − µt − exp(ht/2)ut, et =
yt −α−Byt−1, h = (h1, h2, . . . , hT )′, and Y = (y1,y2, . . . ,yT ) = (h,Y∗′)′.
We are going to use Bayesian methods for estimation and assume the following
prior distributions: µt ∼ N (µ0, τ 20 ), t = 1, 2, . . . , T , β ∼ N (β0,Ω0), Σ ∼ IW(ν0,Σ0).
In addition, we set hyper-parameters as µ0 = 0, τ 20 = 100, β0 = 0, Ω0 = 100 · I,
ν0 = m+1 and Σ0 = 0.01 ·I, which make the variance of prior distributions diffuse. In
the empirical analysis, we run the MCMC algorithm, which is described in Appendix
A, for 10, 000 iterations after a burn-in phase of 10, 000 iterations.
3 Data
Following Lise et al. (2014) and Inui et al. (2017) we derive the Gini coefficient us-
ing the Japanese household survey called Family Income and Expenditures Survey
(FIES), which is compiled by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications. The survey is carried out on a monthly basis and collects data
on earnings, income and consumption expenditures for about 9,000 households and
is appropriately adjusted to make the sample size to nt = n = 10, 000 in order to com-
pensate the difference in sampling ratios for strata. The survey unit are households in
the entire area of Japan.3 We use the monthly subset of the survey that covers house-
hold incomes and expenditures. Each wave of the survey offers among other data on
consumption expenditure, the frequency distribution over 18 groups of yearly pre-tax
income: xt = x = (200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 700, 750, 800, 900,
1000, 1250, 1500)′, which are collected from Table 8-2 ”Amounts of Savings and Lia-
bilities Held per Household by Yearly Income Group”. Income data refers to actual
income including tax (i.e., the sum of cash income of all household members), cash
on hand carried over from previous months, and so-called “spurious income”. The
latter is defined as an increase in cash accompanied by a decrease in assets and in-
crease in liabilities. As an example, the sale of a house generates cash, but decreases
households assets. By the same token, if a household borrows money from a bank,
cash increases in parallel with household’s liabilities. Both cash increases would be
labeled spurious income and are included in overall pre-tax income of households.
The 10,000 surveyed households can be roughly divided into two groups: workers’
households are those whose heads are employed as clerks or wage earners by pub-
lic or private enterprises, such as government office, private companies, factories,
schools, hospitals, and shops. Workers’ households account for roughly half of the
3The survey excludes one-person student households, inpatients in hospital, inmates of reforma-
tory institutions, households which manage restaurants, hotels, boarding houses or dormitories, shar-
ing their dwellings, households which serve meals to the boarders even though not managing board-
ing houses as an occupation, households with 4 or more living-in employees, households whose heads
are absent for a long time (three months or more) and foreigner households. For more details, see
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/.
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10,000 observations in each survey wave. All households include on top of workers’
households, those whose heads are individual proprietors (e.g., merchants, artisans,
administrators of unincorporated enterprise, farmers, about 10% of all observations)
and those with no occupation (unemployed and retired, about 35% of all observa-
tions).4 Due to changes in the sample design and to get a consistent income series
our data starts from 2002Q1.
Pre-tax income data are complemented by macroeconomic data such as real GDP
(rgdp), the unemployment rate (unempl), 10-year government bond yields (ltir),
the real effective exchange rate (reer) and stock market prices (eq) measured by
the NIKKEI225 index. As pointed out in Amaral (2017), inflation expectations are
a crucial determinant of inequality. We measure inflation expectations, as one-year
ahead projections of consumer price inflation (p). Inflation forecasts are obtained
from the IMF’s biannual world economic outlook database and converted to quar-
terly frequency by reusing the biannual observations over the quarterly frequency
domain. Last we include several measures for the monetary policy stance of the
Bank of Japan (BoJ). These include the overnight effective call rate (stir), 2-year
government bond yields (2ygby) and the shadow rate (ssr) of Wu and Xia (2016).
Exchange rate data stem from the BIS and an increase denotes an appreciation in real
terms; all other macroeconomic data are obtained via the FRED database, https:
//fred.stlouisfed.org/.5 Our sample for the combined income and macro data
spans the period from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4.
In a first step and to assess the accuracy of the proposed modeling framework, we
plot the estimated Gini coefficient over time. The results are depicted in Fig. 1.
The figure shows that changes in income inequality in Japan over the sample
period have been quite modest. For data using all households, the Gini was largest
at the beginning of the sample (about 0.3) and increased slightly from 2013 onward.
The Gini coefficient based on data for workers’ households shows a similar picture,
with the exception that data for the most recent sample period indicates a decline in
inequality, while figures for all households do not show a clear trend for that period.
Our estimated time series is well in line with other Gini coefficients derived from
descriptive stastiics as in Inui et al. (2017) and Saiki and Frost (2014).
4 The effects of monetary policy on inequality
To assess the effects of monetary policy shocks on income inequality we have es-
timated the vector autoregression in equ. 2.2 that jointly models the dynamics of
income inequality (i.e., the Gini coefficient) and the macroeconomic variables.
4The remaining 5% are accounted for by other professional services and corporative
administrators.
5Data mnemonics are as follows, rgdp:JPNRGDPEXP, ltir:IRLTLT01JPM156N, eq:NIKKEI225 and
m3:MABMM301JPM189S.
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Fig. 1: Estimated Gini coefficient
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(b) Workers’ households
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There are three prominent channels through which monetary policy might affect
income inequality. First, the inflation tax channel postulates that a decrease in infla-
tion, after a monetary policy tightening disproportionately affect purchasing power of
households since those at the lower end of the income distribution typically hold more
cash (Erosa and Ventura, 2002). Second, the earnings heterogeneity or job destruction
channel states that income / occupation of poorer households is more strongly shaped
by changes in the unemployment rate than that of richer households for which hourly
wages are a more prominent factor as a determinant of income (Amaral, 2017). Put
differently, if the central bank raises rates and the unemployment rate increases, poor
households are disproportionately more strongly affected and income inequality in-
creases (Inui et al., 2017). Last, the income composition channel works if households
in different segments of the income distribution rely on different sources of income
(e.g., labor, business and capital, see Amaral, 2017, for more details.). Depending
on the distribution of income sources, the effect of an interest rate increase might be
either income inequality reducing or enhancing and thus remains to be empirically
assessed.
Since over our sample period the policy rate in Japan was practically zero over a
longer period of time, a shock to the overnight call rate might yield misleading results.
We thus propose three interest rate based alternative instruments that indicate the
BoJ’s monetary policy stance. As a baseline measure we use the shadow rate proposed
in Wu and Xia (2016). The shadow rate is extracted using a term structure model
that allows the relaxation of the zero lower bound of nominal short-term rates. In
normal times the shadow rate mimics short-term interest rates, where in times these
rates are confined to the zero lower-bound but the central bank provides stimulus
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using other forms of monetary policy, the shadow rate can become negative. It thus
indicates the monetary policy stance of a central bank even if actual interest rates are
zero, which is the case for the sample period we cover. In a robustness exercise we
follow Spiegel and Tai (2017) who use 2-year Japanese government bond yields as the
policy instrument. The third measure considers the term spread as a monetary policy
instrument. Here we focus on the spread between 10-year government bond yields
and the overnight call rate and hence a longer segment of the yield curve compared
to 2-year government bond yields. That central banks aim at reducing interest rate
spreads such as the term spread to steer inflation and inflation expectations has been
argued in Blinder (2012). Recent studies investigating term spread shocks as a means
of monetary policy during zero lower bound periods include Baumeister and Benati
(2013) for the USA and UK, Bobeica and Jarocin´ski (2017) for the euro area and
Feldkircher et al. (2017) for a broad set of countries.
One could argue that all three measures also capture unconventional monetary
policy which impacts on wealth rather than income inequality since bringing down
long-term yields affects financial markets and wealth of households holding these
assets. That said, some effects should be also seen on the distribution of income.
Foremost, the spurious income component of our income data is naturally affected
by asset / house price movements. Moreover, since (longer-term) interest rates are
moved, some of the channels mentioned above could also be operational and income
inequality affected.6 Also, Saiki and Frost (2014) examining the effects of the BoJ’s
asset purchases report a strong empirical correlation between income and wealth in-
equality in Japan, and Inui et al. (2017) using Japanese data of households balance
sheet conclude that distributions of households financial assets and liabilities do not
play a significant role in the distributional effects of monetary policy. Hence an as-
sessment of monetary policy on income inequality in Japan seems warranted.
Throughout the paper we rely on a simple Cholesky decomposition to identify
monetary policy shocks, which requires categorizing the set of macroeconomic vari-
ables into slow and fast moving variables. This “recursiveness” assumption has been
frequently used in the literature on monetary policy shocks and its implications are
discussed at length in, among others, Christiano et al. (1999). We assume the follow-
ing ordering of variables:
6In theory, since older households tend to depend more strongly on interest rate income – which
is not covered in the income data available for this study – quantitative easing should decline income
inequality (Amaral, 2017).
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yt =

gini
rgdp
p
unempl
policy instrument
ltir
reer
eq

.
As discussed above, in our baseline estimation, the policy instrument is going to
be the shadow rate. The ordering implies that the Gini coefficient, real GDP, inflation
expectations and the unemployment rate do not react within the same quarter to an
unexpected increase in the policy rate. By contrast, long-term interest rates, the ex-
change rate and equity prices are allowed to react immediately to a monetary policy
shock.7 For the term spread shock we have to slightly modify the ordering of the
variables substituting short-term rates for the policy instrument and the term spread
for long-rates (ltir). All shocks are calibrated as a +100bp increase in the policy in-
strument. Note that in what follows we report estimates of σ as the ”Gini coefficient”
rather than its monotone transform G.
Our main results are provided in Fig. 2. The figure shows the posterior median
(solid line) along with a 68% credible interval, in orange for the Gini coefficient based
on data covering all households, and in blue only for workers’ households.
[INCLUDE Fig. 2 HERE]
Our estimates show that in response to the monetary tightening, inflation (expec-
tations) decline, immediately and significantly so for about 6 to 8 quarters. In parallel
with the rate increase, output declines and unemployment increases. More precisely,
after an initial increase in real GDP, output declines significantly up to 28 quarters.
This decline is driven by an increase in the unemployment rate which peaks after 16
quarters. Furthermore the monetary tightening induces an appreciation of the real
effective exchange rate and an increase in long-term yields. The appreciation is likely
to induce an increase in income inequality for workers’ households since part of them
are employed in the tradable sector and the loss of competitiveness has to be cush-
ioned with subsequent wage decreases and / or worker layoffs. This effect is likely to
be more muted for all households for which a large fraction is not employed. Stock
prices show a very similar picture to real output: while they initially pick up, there is
a persistent decline up to 28 quarters. In general, our results are qualitatively similar
to those provided in Nakajima et al. (2011) who use a more complex time-varying
7A similar ordering has been applied in the robustness section of Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou
(2017).
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Fig. 2: Responses to an increase in the shadow rate
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Notes: The plot shows structural responses to a 100bp increase in the shadow rate using a Cholesky decompo-
sition. In blue, Gini based on all households, in orange only for workers’ households. Posterior median along
68% credible sets. An increase in the real effective exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation.
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parameter VAR with stochastic volatility. In this sense we do not find evidence for
counterintuitive output and price responses often reported for Japanese data.8 We
obtain qualitatively similar results when looking at a positive shock to 2-year govern-
ment bond yields, or the term spread. See Fig. B.1 in the appendix. That we obtain
plausible responses from a macroeconomic standpoint ensures our confidence that
we have successfully pinned down a monetary policy shock.
Turning to the focal variable, the Gini coefficient, our results indicate an increase
in inequality when income data are based on households whose head is employed
(workers’ households, orange line). This result would be in line with estimates of
Coibion et al. (2017) for the USA and theoretical predictions based on a New Key-
nesian model provided in Gornemann et al. (2012). However, results reverse when
considering the broader definition of income data (all households, blue line). Here, a
monetary policy tightening decreases inequality over the medium term. That we get
different responses for the two types of households holds also true when considering
the other two policy measures, albeit to a smaller degree (see Figures B.1 and B.2).
Summing up, we find that a tightening of the monetary policy stance, decreases
inflation expectations, output and equity prices, while the real effective exchange rate
appreciates and unemployment rises. These findings are in line with common eco-
nomic reasoning and ensure overall confidence in our estimation strategy. It turns
out that these macroeconomic developments have very distinct effects on workers’
households compared to a broader definition of households. For workers’ house-
holds, a monetary tightening leads to more inequality – a finding which is in line with
recent empirical work such as Coibion et al. (2017) for the USA and Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou (2017) for the UK. By contrast, income inequality decreases when
considering a broader definition of households corroborating results of Saiki and Frost
(2014) using the monetary base as a policy instrument for Japan. In the next subsec-
tion we are going to examine the transmission channels of monetary policy in more
detail.
4.1 Through which channels does monetary policy affect income inequality?
To investigate the relative strength of the various transmission channels, we con-
secutively “shut down” the effects of each variable modeled in our VAR framework.
Following Ludvigson et al. (2002), this is done by setting the respective coefficients
in matrix B to zero, when calculating the impulse response functions.9 This exer-
cise pins down two variables that shape the response of income inequality, namely
8For example Nakashima et al. (2017) attribute these short-run anomalies in output and price
behavior to revision of expectations of market participants regarding future economic conditions.
9More precisely, for each variable we set coefficients in the respective rows of B and A to zero,
where Σ = AA′ is a Cholesky decomposition of Σ.
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long-term rates, the unemployment rate and the real effective exchange rate. Figure
3 below shows the respective results.
[INCLUDE Fig. 3 HERE]
We first examine the different monetary policy effects on income inequality in the
two household groups. So far we have seen that the macroeconomic responses to
the monetary tightening are very similar, but the effect on inequality differs across
household groups. Consecutively switching off “channels” reveals that the different
responses arise due to effects through long-term interest rates, displayed in the top of
Fig. 3. In the model without effects through long-term interest rates, income inequal-
ity for both household groups slightly decreases when monetary policy is tightened.
Looking at the mechanics behind that finding, excluding effects through long-rates
changes the response of the unemployment rate, which is now rather insensitive to
the rate increase. It also neutralizes the effect of the monetary tightening on the ex-
change rate. Both variables could ultimately cause the different responses on income
inequality.
Thus, we next examine effects through the unemployment rate depicted in the
middle panel of Fig. 3. Here we see that responses of the shadow rate and long-term
rates are similar as before, while those of real GDP and inflation are no longer pre-
cisely estimated. Also, switching off the unemployment rate reveals a significant real
effective depreciation as opposed to an appreciation when all transmission channels
are effective. Looking at the response of the Gini coefficient for workers’ households
shows that without effects through unemployment the rise in inequality is more mod-
erate. This implies that the typical job destruction channel is operative for workers’
households and a rise in unemployment through a monetary tightening leads to more
income inequality. The channel is less pronounced when considering all households
which is not surprising since part of these households are without occupation.
Since we still see the different responses of the Gini between the the types of
households, we last examine the direct effects of the real exchange rate. These re-
sponses are provided in the bottom panel of Fig. 3. Here we still see a positive effect
on the Gini for workers’ households, possibly driven by the rise in unemployment as
evidenced above, but the response is no longer significant. This suggests that the
exchange rate channel is an important driver of inequality for workers’ households.
Summing up, we find evidence of a typical job-destruction channel for workers’
households: as interest rates increase, unemployment rises which affects poor house-
holds (that can be laid off more easily) more strongly triggering a rise in income
inequality. We also find that the difference of distributional effects of monetary pol-
icy between workers’ and all households are driven effects through long-term rates
and ultimately the real effective exchange rate. A real appreciation puts firms under
pressure to either lay off workers (and thus drive up the unemployment rate) or de-
crease wages. Both measures lead to more inequality for workers’ households. The
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effects are less pronounced when considering all households since a large share of
these have no occupation. This implies that the inflation tax channel dominates when
considering the broad income group since offsetting forces (i.e., job destruction and
real effective exchange rate) are not present. This finding is robust to considering
increases in 2-year government bond yields as well as the term spread as a monetary
policy instrument.
4.2 Does the estimation of the Gini coefficient affect the results?
In this paper we have outlined a joint estimation strategy of the measure of income
inequality and the macroeconomic vector autoregressive model. An alternative often
pursued in the literature is to treat estimated Gini coefficients as if they were observ-
able data neglecting inherent estimation uncertainty. As pointed out in Carriero et al.
(2017) these “two-step” procedures potentially lead to flawed inference. In the con-
text of income inequality, in case the Gini is calculated by descriptive statistics using
grouped data, inequality tends to be underestimated. This point is illustrated in Fig. 4
below:
[INCLUDE Fig. 4 HERE]
The true Lorenz curve (solid line) is drawn assuming a log-normal distribution
and the Lorenz curve from grouped data (dotted line) is drawn from simulated in-
come data assuming the log-normal distribution. The simulated data is constructed
as follows. First, 100, 000 observations are simulated from the log-normal distribu-
tion. The observations are sorted in an ascending order, and are divided into quintile
groups. Then, we can calculate the class income means. Using the frequencies and
class income means, we can finally draw the Lorenz curve from grouped data. The
Gini derived from grouped data is shown in red, while the one from true distribution
is in red plus blue. The graph illustrates that the Gini coefficient from grouped data
(red area) can not capture the full area (blue area). The reason behind is the under-
lying assumption of equal income within each group and this assumption leads to an
underestimation of inequality, especially in the top income group.
In what follows we contrast the responses of the Gini coefficient obtained under
the joint estimation framework with that of a two-step “plug-in” approach. The results
are displayed in Fig. 5 below showing responses related to the joint estimation in blue
and those based on the two-step estimation in orange respectively.
[INCLUDE Fig. 5 HERE]
In the left-hand side of the plot we show the estimated responses for the two types
of households and the different policy instruments. Looking at our baseline results
14
Fig. 4: Lorenz curve and its Gini coefficient
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0 True
Grouped
15
Fi
g.
5:
C
om
pa
ri
si
on
of
jo
in
t
ve
rs
us
tw
o-
st
ep
es
ti
m
at
io
n
W
or
ke
rs
’h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
Sh
ad
ow
ra
te
−
0.
00
4
−
0.
00
1
 
0.
00
1
 
0.
00
4
 
0.
00
6
 
0.
00
9
 
0.
01
1
 
0.
01
4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
G
ov
.
bo
nd
yi
el
ds
−
1e
−0
2
−
7e
−0
4
 
1e
−0
2
 
2e
−0
2
 
4e
−0
2
 
5e
−0
2
 
6e
−0
2
 
8e
−0
2
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Te
rm
sp
re
ad
−
0.
33
−
0.
15
 
0.
02
 
0.
19
 
0.
37
 
0.
54
 
0.
72
 
0.
89
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Sh
ad
ow
ra
te
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
−0.02−0.010.000.010.02
Jo
in
t
Two−step
G
ov
.
bo
nd
yi
el
ds
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
−0.050.000.050.100.15
Jo
in
t
Two−step
Te
rm
sp
re
ad
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.000.050.100.15
Jo
in
t
Two−step
A
ll
ho
u
se
ho
ld
s
Sh
ad
ow
ra
te
−
1e
−0
2
−
1e
−0
2
−
1e
−0
2
−
7e
−0
3
−
5e
−0
3
−
3e
−0
3
−
5e
−0
4
 
2e
−0
3
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
G
ov
.
bo
nd
yi
el
ds
−
0.
06
0
−
0.
04
7
−
0.
03
4
−
0.
02
2
−
0.
00
9
 
0.
00
4
 
0.
01
7
 
0.
02
9
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Te
rm
sp
re
ad
−
0.
03
6
−
0.
02
6
−
0.
01
6
−
0.
00
6
 
0.
00
5
 
0.
01
5
 
0.
02
5
 
0.
03
6
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
Sh
ad
ow
ra
te
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
−0.02−0.010.000.01
Jo
in
t
Two−step
G
ov
.
bo
nd
yi
el
ds
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
−0.050.000.050.10
Jo
in
t
Two−step
Te
rm
sp
re
ad
−
0.
04
−
0.
02
0.
00
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
−0.040.000.020.040.06
Jo
in
t
Two−step
Th
e
pl
ot
sh
ow
s
th
e
re
sp
on
se
s
of
th
e
G
in
ic
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
co
m
pa
ri
ng
th
e
tw
o-
st
ep
ap
pr
oa
ch
(o
ra
ng
e)
w
it
h
th
e
jo
in
t
es
ti
m
at
io
n
(b
lu
e)
.
Th
e
le
ft
pa
ne
l
of
th
e
pl
ot
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
s
al
on
g
w
it
h
68
%
cr
ed
ib
le
se
ts
,t
he
ri
gh
tp
an
el
th
e
jo
in
td
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of
th
e
re
sp
on
se
af
te
r
on
e
qu
ar
te
r.
To
p
pa
ne
lf
or
w
or
ke
rs
’h
ou
se
ho
ld
s,
bo
tt
om
pa
ne
lf
or
al
lh
ou
se
ho
ld
s.
16
with the shadow rate first, we see estimating the Gini and the macroeconomic re-
sponses in a joint framework leads to significant medium term responses according
to the 68% credible intervals. This holds true although the credible sets are partic-
ularly wide, which is not surprising since estimation uncertainty regarding the Gini
coefficient is correctly taken into account in the joint estimation framework. The
two-step estimation procedure, by contrast, produces responses that go in the same
direction as those obtained under joint estimation but are much flatter and credible
intervals contain the zero response throughout the forecast horizon. On the right
hand side of the plot we show in addition the joint distribution of the Gini response
of the two approaches after 1 quarter. Points clustered around the 45 degree line
indicate that both responses are not statistically different from each other. Looking at
the results for the shadow rates, this seems to be indeed the case.
Next we examine Gini responses to an increase in 2-year government bond yields.
Here a similar picture arises as before, namely that both responses point in general
into the same direction but responses of the plug-in approach are hovering around
zero. The difference in responses can be also seen by looking at the scatterplots. For
example, for workers’ households most of the mass of the joint distribution lies below
the 45 degree line indicating a stronger response when using the joint compared to
the two-step estimation approach. Considering all households, impact responses of
the two approaches are more similar. Last, we consider Gini responses to a term
spread shock. Here we also see that responses based on the joint estimation approach
point to a significant increase in inequality in the short-run, while two-step estimates
are close to zero. The scatterplots strongly corroborate the higher responses in case
of workers’ households and slightly so in case of all households.
Summing up, we find striking differences in responses of the Gini coefficient. Esti-
mating jointly the Gini coefficient and the dynamics of the macroeconomic system we
find significant impacts of monetary policy on the distribution of income inequality.
This holds true despite the fact that the joint estimation takes estimation uncertainty
into account while the two-step approach commonly used in the literature ignores
it. Our results further show that joint estimation leads to more informative inference
but reveals significantly higher responses than the two-step approach. Taken at face
value this implies that part of the inconclusive findings on income inequality using
Japanese data can be attributed to the estimation framework (see e.g., Inui et al.,
2017).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the relationship between monetary policy and income in-
equality in Japan. For that purpose we propose a new framework that models jointly
the volatility of the income distribution and the dynamics of key macroeconomic vari-
17
ables. Our model draws on grouped data that is continuously available over a longer
period than comparable micro-based data.
The empirical literature assessing monetary policy effects on income inequality
has revealed a large degree of cross-country heterogeneity. This is the case since the
theoretical effect is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of transmission
channels / endowments of households. Using three different measures of monetary
policy for Japan, we find that a monetary tightening leads to a significant rise in in-
equality in the short-run when considering income data of households whose head is
employed (so-called workers’ households). This result is in line with recent findings
of Coibion et al. (2017) for the USA, Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou (2017) for the
UK and Furceri et al. (2017) for a broad set of countries. This result reverses though,
when using a broader measure of income that also considers households whose head
is either self-employed, retired or unemployed (all households). Delving deeper re-
veals that mainly two transmission channels account for the effect of monetary policy
on income inequality for workers’ households. Here, a rise in unemployment trig-
gered by the monetary tightening increases inequality (i.e., a job destruction chan-
nel). This channel is re-enforced through movements of the exchange rate: As the
real effective exchange rate appreciates firms in the tradable sector either have to lay
off workers or cut wages, leading to an increase in inequality. These effects are not ev-
ident when considering all households. Here, both the job destruction and exchange
rate channels are ineffective, while the tax inflation channel triggers a decrease in
inequality: Households that use more cash benefit more from the decrease in infla-
tion expectations - monetary tightening which leads to less inequality corroborating
findings of Saiki and Frost (2014) for Japan.
Having established these findings we then show that not only the type of underly-
ing data matters for the assessment of monetary policy effects on income inequality
but also the estimation framework. Our proposed framework treats estimation of the
Gini coefficient as an inequality measure and the dynamics of the macroeconomic
system jointly. In contrast most studies on inequality derive the Gini coefficient in
a first step and treat it as if observed in the subsequent econometric analysis. That
this can lead to flawed inference has been pointed out by Carriero et al. (2017) in
the context of macroeconomic uncertainty. Comparing our results with those based
on the predominant two-step approach indeed leads to striking differences. While
credible sets of the jointly estimated responses are wider since they also reflect esti-
mation uncertainty related to the Gini coefficient, they point to significant effects of
monetary policy on the distribution of income. Two-step inference, by contrast yields
inconclusive results.
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Appendix A Posterior Analysis
A.1 Sampling µt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T
The full conditional distribution (FCD) of µt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T is given by
µt|ht,xt ∼ N
(
µˆt, τˆ
2
t
)
,
where τˆ 2t = (exp(−ht)1′kW∗t−11k+τ−20 )−1, µˆt = τˆ 2t
{
exp(−ht)1′kW∗t−1 (ln xt − exp(ht/2)ut) + τ−20 µ0
}
,
and 1k is a k × 1 unit vector.
A.2 Sampling ht for t = 1, 2, . . . , T
pi(ht|µt,α,B,Σ,h−t,Y∗,xt) ∝ exp(−ht/2) exp
(
−v
′
tW
∗−1
t vt
2 exp(ht)
)
f(ht),
where h−t = (h1, h2, . . . , ht−1, ht+1, . . . , hT ) and
f(ht) =

exp
(
−e
′
tΣ
−1et + e′t+1Σ
−1et+1
2
)
, if t < T
exp
(
−e
′
tΣ
−1et
2
)
, if t = T
.
In the sampling of ht for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , we use normal distributions as the proposal
distributions along with tuned random-walk procedures suggested by Holloway et al.
(2002).
A.3 Sampling α, B and Σ
Let y = vec(Y) and Z =
{
(Im ⊗ (1,y′0))′, (Im ⊗ (1,y′1))′, . . . , (Im ⊗ (1,y′T−1))′
}′, re-
spectively, where Im is an m×m unit matrix. Then,
β|Σ,Y ∼ NS
(
βˆ, Ωˆ
)
,
Σ|α,B,Y ∼ IW
(
νˆ, Σˆ
)
where β = vec {(α,B)′}, S is the space, where B satisfies the stationary condition,
Ωˆ =
{
Z′ (IT ⊗Σ−1) Z + Ω−10
}−1, βˆ = Ωˆ{Z′ (IT ⊗Σ−1) y + Ω−10 β0}, νˆ = T + ν0,
Σˆ = EE′ + Σ0, and E = (e1, e2, . . . , eT ).
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Fig. B.1: Responses to an increase in 2-year government bond yields
(a) Gini
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Notes: The plot shows structural responses to a 100bp increase in 2-year government bond yields using a
Cholesky decomposition. In blue, Gini based on all households, in orange only for workers’ households. Poste-
rior median along 68% credible sets. An increase in the real effective exchange rate corresponds to an appreci-
ation.
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Fig. B.2: Responses to an increase in the term spread
(a) Gini
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Notes: The plot shows structural responses to a 100bp increase in the shadow rate using a Cholesky decompo-
sition. In blue, Gini based on all households, in orange only for workers’ households. Posterior median along
68% credible sets. An increase in the real effective exchange rate corresponds to an appreciation.
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